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through 3D Integrated Hardware 
 
This project is investigating a novel approach to trustworthy system development based on 3D integration, an emerging chip 
fabrication technique in which two or more integrated circuit dies are combined into a single stack using vertical conductive 
posts. Since the dies may be manufactured separately, 3D circuit integration offers the option of enhancing a commodity 
processor with a variety of custom security functions, which are manufacturing options applicable only to those systems that 
require them. This research introduces a fundamentally new method to incorporate security mechanisms into hardware and 
has the potential to significantly shift the economics of trustworthy systems. We use the term computation plane to refer to a 
commodity processor die, and we use the term control plane to refer to an additional die, containing customized security 
functions, that is joined to the computation plane. Since the computation plane must be able to function correctly in the 
absence of the control plane, circuit-level primitives are used in conjunction with the posts for communication between the 
planes. The basic classes of 3D “applications” that can be constructed include: (1) secure alternate service; (2) isolation and 
protection; and (3) passive monitoring. 
Ted Huffmire, Ryan Kastner, Tim Sherwood, Cynthia Irvine, Tim Levin, and Jonathan Valamehr 
http://cisr.nps.edu/projects/3dsec.html 
Secure Alternate Service 
A secure alternate service provides a trustworthy 
enhancement or alternative to the service provided in the 
computation plane. An example of a secure alternate 
service is a cryptographic processor and secure storage 
implemented in the control plane, like a traditional 
coprocessor but with much higher bandwidth. 
Cryptographic keys and other valuable data can be stored 
and protected in the control plane. Other secure alternate 
services include computation logic (e.g., ALU, stack, etc.) 
and processor-core interconnect (e.g., bus and network-on-
chip grids), which can be implemented in the control plane 
either as an addition or enhancement to existing 
mechanisms in the computation plane or as a duplicate but 
more highly assured service. 
Isolation and Protection 
Another category of control plane application actively overrides the computation plane to enforce some 
security policy, such as for access control. In one form, this type of mechanism can eliminate points of 
interference, such as the cache and branch prediction unit. Disabling connections (e.g., “cutting” wires) to 
isolate or control the flow of information between cores in a multi-core computation plane (viz., per the 
reference monitor concept) also falls under this category. Points of interference in the computation plane 
include architectural elements such as the cache and branch prediction units which are hardware features 
from different protection domains. 3D control functions that actively override the connections to these 
shared resources can eliminate their misuse, for example, if one process can observe the cache use of 
another process, a covert channel can be established between them. A function in the control plane can 
eliminate this covert channel by overriding the computation plane such that each process is restricted to its 
designated region of the cache. Side channels have become a vexing problem as new points of interference 
are realized, e.g., in the cache or branch prediction unit. To solve this requires identification of the cut points 
required to isolate a processor, severing the ones that are not critical and saving or restoring the rest. 
Passive Monitoring 
Another broad category of control plane application is 
that which passively monitors the computation plane. 
These applications may record various properties and 
values from the computation plane, but do not alter any 
data or behavior. Examples include auditing and 
information flow tracking, or computing and reporting a 
checksum on the architectural state of the computation 
plane to ensure a secure boot sequence, for example. 
Passive monitoring can also be used to perform runtime 
checks on the computation plane for security and 
correctness, enhancing runtime self-tests of the 
processor, and performance profiling. 
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